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Abstract
This paper concentrates on the representation of the legal
relations that obtain between parties once they have
entered a contractual agreement and their evolution as the
agreement progresses through time.  Contracts are
regarded as process and they are analysed in terms of the
obligations that are active at various points during their
life span.  An informal notation is introduced that
summarizes conveniently the states of an agreement as it
evolves over time.  Such a representation enables us to
determine what the status of an agreement is, given an
event or a sequence of events that concern the
performance of actions by the agents involved.  This is
useful both in the context of contract drafting (where
parties might wish to preview how their agreement might
evolve) and in the context of contract performance
monitoring (where parties might with to establish what
their legal positions are once their agreement is in force).
The discussion is based on an example that illustrates
some typical patterns of contractual obligations.
Keywords: legal contract representation, transition diagrams,
temporally qualified obligations, dynamic system modelling.
1. Introduction
This paper reports on work that was carried out within a
larger project that was concerned with the representation
of legal contracts in order to develop tools to support
various kinds of contractual activity, such as the
management and administration of existing contracts and
the drafting of new ones.
The term ‘contract’ is commonly used to refer both to a
legally binding agreement between (at least) two parties
and to the document that records such agreement, where it
is required that it be put in writing.  This paper is
concerned with the representation of the legal relations that
obtain between parties and therefore focuses on contracts
as agreements rather than as documents.  Moreover, the
larger project within which this work falls was concerned
with complex, long-term bilateral agreements rather than
one-off or unilateral business exchanges.  The contracts
that were primarily examined came from engineering
areas; for example some concerned the purchase of natural
gas from hydrocarbon field owners or the construction of
electrical or mechanical plants in the UK and abroad.  Such
agreements tend to be long-term with a typical life-span of
five to ten years and consequently they tend to make
provision for a multitude of interrelated issues, some typical
of contracts in general (such as billing and payment
arrangements, delivery times and quantities and so on), some
typical of engineering contracts in particular (such as
insurance arrangements, assignment and sub-contracting
terms and so on) and some typical of the particular kind of
engineering (natural gas purchase contracts for instance
contain many provisions about quality and quality
monitoring issues whereas construction contracts contain
many provisions about amendments to the original plans for
the plant in question).  Because of their long life-span and
the large costs that may be potentially incurred through an
omission or a mistake during contract formation or through
an inadvertent violation during contract performance, parties
tend to spend a considerable time negotiating them and once
they are in force each party monitors its own and its counter-
party’s actions closely.  Representing contracts as evolving
collections of interrelated contractual obligations is therefore
useful in two contexts: During contract formation it enables
a preview of each party’s obligations under various scenarios
that could emerge once the agreement is in force.  During
contract performance it enables the establishment of the
parties’ legal relations at a given point in time.
The paper introduces an informal schematic notation that
can be used to summarize the structure of agreements as
collections of interrelated obligations.  Though formal
semantics have not yet been developed for the notation, as it
stands it enables us to observe the status of legal relations
between parties as a contract evolves over time, as a
dynamic system.  Dynamic systems raise interesting
questions about their safety and liveness properties.  These
are not addressed here, but the interested reader is referred to
[4] and [11] for a detailed account of such issues.
2. A Typical two-party agreement
A simple two-party agreement will serve to illustrate the
main concepts presented here.  Consider the following pizza-
ordering exchange where a contract is formed between a
purchaser (Peter) and a seller (Susan).  Although the
example is simple on the surface it exhibits some features
that are typical of lengthier, more complex agreements: a
certain future behaviour is stipulated for the parties, the
obligations they assume are time-bounded, provision is
made in case an obligation is not fulfilled (the price is
reduced in case of late delivery), a third-party (the
anonymous driver) is involved, a certain description is
stipulated for the goods that are to be delivered and
(dynamic) pricing and payment arrangements are made.
The example is in this sense a smaller (in size) version of
the kinds of agreements that have been analysed in
practice.
Peter: Hi, I would like to order a pizza from your
menu please.
Susan: Certainly.  What kind of pizza would you
like and what size?
Peter: The “Good Earth Vegetarian”* please, but
without onions.  Large, please.
Susan: Very well, that will be £13.95, cash
please.  What is the address?
Peter: 12 Hunger Lane.  How long will that be?
Susan: It is now 7 pm and we promise to deliver
within half an hour.  If our driver takes any
longer than that, we deduct £1.00 from your bill.
Peter: Ok, thank you.
*The menu description of “Good Earth
Vegetarian”: mushrooms, onions, red and green
peppers, all topped with mozzarella.
Let us first consider a simplified version of the pizza-
ordering agreement between Peter and Susan, where
detailed temporal elements are ignored.  This simple
version of the agreement is that Susan is to deliver a pizza
(of specified size, quantity and description) and Peter is to
pay the required price in return for such delivery.
Let us introduce some elements of the notation that will
be used in our discussion of the simplified pizza-ordering
agreement.  Let  :x  stand for “agent x  sees to it that
 
”.  Expressions of the form  :xnot  are intended to
be read as “it is not the case that agent x  sees to it that
 
”.  The simplified agreement C between Susan and Peter
can be represented in terms of the obligations that are
imposed on the parties.  These can be represented by
expressions of the form  xO , which denote that it is
obligatory for agent x  to see to it that   .  Such
expressions are not necessarily assumed to be closed under
logical consequence.  As we will see in a moment, we also
need a conditional.
The simplified agreement between Peter and Susan
goes as follows, where   stands for “delivering a pizza of
the specified size, quantity and description to Peter”, 
stands for “paying the required price to Susan”, s  stands
for Susan and p  stands for Peter:
It is obligatory for Susan to see to it that a pizza (of
specified size, quantity and description) is delivered to
Peter, that is, sO .  If Susan fulfils her obligation, then it
is obligatory for Peter to see to it that the required price is
paid to Susan, that is, if :s  then pO .  If Susan does not
fulfil her obligation, that is, if 

:snot
 then it is not
obligatory for Peter to see to it that she gets paid, that is,


pO .  In this case, other norms may also apply.
According to Contract Law (cf. [3]) non-fulfilment of
contractual obligations yields different consequences,
depending on the status of the violated provision.  If a party
violates a provision that was deemed as a promissory
condition, then the counter-party may claim damages and
declare the contract void (thus all of the counter-party’s
obligations under the contract are discharged).  On the other
hand, if a party violates a provision that was deemed as a
warranty, then the counter-party may claim damages, but the
contract persists, that is, the counter-party remains bound to
his own obligations under the contract.  If Susan’s obligation

sO  is a promissory condition, then following its breach
Peter bears no obligations and she may be obliged to pay
damages.  That is, where   denotes paying damages, if
	
:snot , then 
 sp OO .  If Susan’s obligation is a
warranty, then following its breach Peter is still obliged to
see to it that she gets paid and she is obliged to see to it that
damages are paid to Peter, that is, if 
:snot , then



sp OO .  It might be the case that the contract does not
specify anything in particular for the case where Susan
violates her obligation (perhaps because when the agreement
was formed, the status of this obligation as a promissory
condition or a warranty was not established, that is, it was
left as an intermediate term).  In this case following

:snot  the agreement is perhaps terminated and no
specific remedies are available to Peter, although possible
litigation might ensue to establish whether he might claim
damages.
Given these possibilities for the case where Susan
violates her obligation, let us assume that the first is the
intended one, that is, 



sp OO  after :snot .  A
natural question to pose is what happens if Susan fulfils her
obligation to see to it that damages are paid to Peter, that is,
what happens after :s ?  One possibility is that the
contract returns to its normal course, that is, Peter’s original
obligation becomes active again ( pO ).  Another possibility
is that the contract is terminated.  A third possibility is that
the contract continues but with different obligations assumed
by the parties, for instance sO  for Susan and some state of
affairs  , and pO  for Peter and some state of affairs  .  A
similar line of questioning can be pursued in relation to
Peter’s obligation to see to it that Susan gets paid, that is, we
can explore what consequences are entailed by the fulfilment
or the violation of such obligation.
The foregone discussion highlights the need for a notation
that summarizes the structure of the contract between Peter
and Susan so that we can determine what obligations hold
for them given certain facts that concern the performance
or otherwise of actions against given obligations.
One possibility is to represent the contract as a state
diagram such as the one illustrated in Figure 1, which
summarizes some of the discussion of the simplified pizza-
ordering example.  Dashed lines indicate the options that
were discussed earlier, that is, whether after Susan’s
violation of her obligation (S3), Peter’s original obligation
comes into force (S1), or whether the contract is terminated
(S3 is final) or whether the contract continues with new
obligations for both parties (S5).
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Each state offers a (possibly partial) view of the status
of the agreement as it evolves given the parties’ actions
with respect to their obligations.  That is, each state
corresponds to the obligations (and more generally other
legal relations such as rights, powers and so on1) that
obtain between the parties.  Transitions correspond to the
performance or non-performance of actions by parties that
effect transformations to the status of the agreement.
There is no attempt here to provide a formal account of
action negation.  Expressions such as 
)
:snot  are
merely labels for a kind of transition.
In the state diagram of Figure 1, state S0 corresponds to
Susan’s obligation 
)sO  and Peter’s obligation *pO
(which is conditional on the fulfilment of 
)sO ).  State S1,
which follows Susan’s fulfilment of her obligation,
corresponds to Peter’s obligation coming into force.
Similarly, state S3, which corresponds to Susan’s violation
of her obligation, corresponds to +,*- sp OO  as was
noted in the earlier discussion.
3. An informal schematic notation
Instead of drawing state diagrams explicitly, we can
adapt a notation found in modal languages for transition
systems such as modal action logic or dynamic logic.
                                                          
1
 Hohfeld’s account [5] of legal notions such as obligation, right, power,
immunity and so on and their interrelationships has been adopted.
Expressions of the form . / A0 , where 1  is the label of a
transition, denote that A  necessarily holds in all states that
are reachable following transition 2 .  Expressions such as
A3  are defined as the dual of 
4 5
A6 , that is,
7 8
AA def 9
:
9
;<
 (“ A  possibly holds in states that are
reachable following transition 
=
”).  Therefore, 
>
? 2
 holds
at a state S when there is a transition labelled 
@
 out of S.
A B
A  denotes that A  is true in all states.  This notation
appears to be similar to Meyer’s deontic logic [8], which is
based on dynamic logic.  In Meyer’s account however,
obligations apply to actions.  The @  in expressions of the
form @Oˆ 3 is an action.  In the account presented here,
obligations apply to states of affairs Y  in expressions of the
form YOx  and @  is a transition between states.
One state is selected as the initial state and Ainitially
means that A  holds in the initial state.  The simplified
contract between Peter and Susan can now be represented as
follows, where terminated is a special symbol denoting a
final state for the agreement:
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Rules such as the above implicitly define the state space
for the agreement.  Initially it is obligatory for Susan to see
to it that a pizza gets delivered to Peter.  It is possible for
Susan to see to it that a pizza gets delivered to Peter and it is
also possible for her not to see to it that this state of affairs is
achieved.  A transition labelled 
Z
:s  from any state in
which Susan’s obligation holds necessarily leads to a state
where it is obligatory for Peter to see to it that Susan gets
paid.  A transition labelled Z:snot  from any state
where Susan’s obligation is in force necessarily leads to a
state in which Peter is not obliged to see to it that she gets
paid and Susan is obliged to see to it that Peter receives
damages.  Peter’s obligation to see to it that Susan gets paid
becomes active in all states following either fulfilment of
ZsO  or fulfilment of [sO .  The agreement is terminated
‘happily’ following Peter’s fulfilment of his obligation or
‘unhappily’ (with possible litigation ensuing) following
Susan’s failure to see to it that damages are awarded to Peter
                                                          
2
 T  is the constant symbol for “true”.
3
 Oˆ  is Meyer’s obligation operator.
(after she fails to deliver the pizza) or Peter’s failure to pay
the required price after Susan successfully delivers the
pizza.
In addition, the following rules are built in, where x is a
variable ranging over agents’ labels and Y  is a variable
ranging over propositional states of affairs:
(i)
\ ]
)Y:xYO( x ^_ that is, where
an agent bears an obligation it is possible
for him to perform an action that fulfils it;
(ii)
` a
)YYPow( xx b
c
d that is, where
an agent has power4 to effect a legal
relation Y  it is possible for him to
exercise such power;
(iii) e f g h )YYYPow( xx
i
j that is, where
an agent has power to effect a legal
relation Y , the legal relation obtains in all
states following his exercise of such
power5.
We could also consider building in the following:
k l
)TY:xnotYxO( m
That is, where an agent bears an obligation it is possible
for him to violate it.  As we shall see later however, this is
a point worthy of more discussion.
In the representation of the simple pizza-ordering
agreement above, we observe structures that are similar to
contrary-to-duty obligations.  For example, concentrating
on Susan’s obligation we have the following6:
k l n o
k l k l
k l k l
)sO:snotsO(
)pO:snotsO(
)pO:ssO(
pq
m
q
r
s
q
m
q
r
q
m
q
That is, if Susan violates her primary obligation 
tsO
then a secondary obligation 
usO comes into effect.
Representing and reasoning about contrary-to-duty
structures in a consistent way has been the topic of much
debate (cf. [1]).  The consensus seems, however, to be that
in temporal settings contrary-to-duty structures are not
problematic (cf. [9, 10]).
At first glance, it might appear that contrary-to-duty
structures are a common feature of contracts.  They seem
to emerge from contractual provisions that specify
reparations in cases where an obligation is violated.
Usually such provisions are associated with warranties.
Contractual provisions are not typically explicitly labelled
as warranties, promissory conditions or intermediate terms.
Normative propositions that stipulate secondary
obligations can be used to establish whether normative
                                                          
4
 “Power” here refers to legal power or legal competence (cf. [5]).
5
 This is a simplifying assumption for the purposes of this discussion.
Bearing legal power does not generally entail having the ability to
exercise it (cf. [4] for further discussion).
6
 Transition labels distribute over compound propositional formulae.
propositions specifying primary obligations are warranties.
In contracts, it is more common for the violation of a
primary obligation by one party x  to be associated with
power for the counter-party z  to bring about a legal relation
R .  That is, in general, the following pattern is typically
encountered:
k l k l
)RzPowY:xnotYxO( m
Such legal relation R  might entail that the contract is
declared void (terminated) if the primary obligation that was
violated is treated as a promissory condition.  Alternatively,
such legal relation R  might entail new obligations for the
offending party.  For simplicity, in the pizza-ordering
example Susan’s violation of her primary obligation entailed
a new obligation for her (to see to it that damages are paid to
Peter usO ).  It is more accurate to say that Susan’s violation
of her primary obligation entails Peter’s power to create a
new obligation 
usO  for her.  That is:
k l k l
)FsOpPowa:snotasO( m
Whether this new obligation will actually come into force
depends on whether Peter chooses to exercise his power.
In discussing violation of obligations, we are interested in
transitions with negative labels.  Let us revisit the original
pizza-ordering example, in which Susan’s obligation to see
to it that a pizza is delivered to Peter was time-bounded and
the pizza in question had to conform to some requirements
of size, quantity and description.  The transition
t:snot  denotes that Susan violates her obligation.
Such violation however may come about in different ways.
For example, Susan might not deliver a pizza at all.  Or a
pizza might be delivered, but it might not conform to the
agreed specification (in terms of size, quantity and
description), that is, Susan brings about something which is
different from what she is obliged to bring about ( ':s
t
).
A third possibility is that the ‘right’ (in terms of size,
quantity and description) pizza is delivered but not within
the agreed time bounds; again Susan brings about something
which is different from what she is obliged to bring about
( '':s t ).  A fourth possibility is that the ‘wrong’ pizza
gets delivered late ( ''':s
t
).  Other possibilities exist by
considering various combinations of what might potentially
count as violation of Susan’s primary obligation (for
instance, the ‘right’ pizza is delivered on time but not by
Susan, the ‘wrong’ pizza is delivered on time by somebody
other than Susan, or the ‘wrong’ pizza is delivered late and
by somebody other than Susan and so on).  Instead of a
single transition labelled t:snot , emerging from a
state in which tsO  holds, we have a cluster of refined
transitions, each corresponding to one aspect of “it is not the
case that Susan sees to it that a pizza of the required size,
quantity and description is delivered to Peter within
specified time bounds”.  This is illustrated in Figure 2, where
)''''''(A qvwvwvwx :
ysO
z
:s
':s {
'':s {
''':s
{A:snot
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It should be stressed again that these are merely labels
for transitions and no attempt is made to provide a formal
account of negation in action descriptions.  Moreover, as
Figure 2 suggests, concurrent actions are in principle
possible from a state but no attempt is made here to
address the logic of concurrent action.
Exploring the consequences entailed by the violation of
an obligation raises other interesting points.  For example,
as was mentioned above, there are various possibilities,
which can be construed as violations of Susan’s obligation
towards Peter.  One way of perceiving the agreement
between Susan and Peter is as follows: Susan is obliged to
deliver a pizza of any type from a range of available
types7, say t1 or t2.  If Susan delivers a pizza of type t1,
then Peter is obliged to pay a price p1.  If Susan delivers a
pizza of type t2, then Peter is obliged to pay a price p2.
Another way of perceiving the agreement between Susan
and Peter is this: Susan is obliged to deliver a pizza of type
t1.  If she delivers a pizza of type t1, then Peter is obliged
to pay a price p1.  If she delivers a pizza of type t2, then
Peter is obliged to pay a price p2 and Susan is no longer
obliged to deliver a pizza of type t1.  The difference
between the two versions is subtle.  In the first version,
Susan is only obliged to deliver a pizza.  The exact amount
that Peter is obliged to pay in return for such delivery is
dependent on what particular kind of pizza is delivered.
Nothing seems to preclude the provision of a pizza of type
t1 after a pizza of type t2 has been successfully delivered.
In the second version, Susan is obliged to deliver a specific
pizza.  Non-fulfilment of her obligation to deliver a pizza
of type t1 discharges such obligation and possibly leads to
secondary (reparation) obligations on her part that are
effected through Peter’s exercise of power.  The gas-
purchase sample contracts that we examined tend to be
like the second version.  They specify precisely what
happens, if the natural gas that is delivered does not
conform to pre-agreed quality standards, or if delivery
quantities and times depart from those stipulated in the
contract (for instance prices are adjusted, additional
                                                          
7
 “Type” here is intended to refer to size, quantity, description and
possible time restrictions that apply.
quantities must be delivered at more frequent intervals to
make up for the under-delivery and so on).
Let us now turn to the temporal elements of the original
pizza-ordering example.  Our informal notation for
representing agreements implicitly defines a state space.  In
principle, time can be associated with states (which
correspond to the collection of obligations and other legal
relations between parties) or with transitions (which
correspond to actions performed by parties).  That is,
expressions of the form YOtx  can be used to denote that at
time t , agent x is obliged to see to it that Y  is the case.  On
the other hand, expressions of the form txYO  can be used to
denote that agent x  is obliged to see to it that Y  is the case
at time t .  In the latter form, time is implicitly associated
with the agent’s action.  Put alternatively, in the latter case
time is associated with the transition Y:x .  We show this
explicitly in our informal notation by extending the labels
for transitions to include time in expressions of the form
t)Y:x( , in which time is specified in absolute or relative
terms, for example via temporal relations such as
before(t), after(t), or between(t1, t2).  Let
 denote “paying a reduced price to Susan”,   denote “a
pizza of the specified size, quantity and description is
delivered to Peter” and   denote “paying the normal price to
Susan”.  The state diagram for the pizza-ordering example is
now as illustrated in Figure 3:
)30:7(at):p(
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:snot
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Note that time is here used informally as a label on
transitions—no attempt is made here to define formal
semantics for it.
4. Concluding Remarks and Future Work
Such representation offers a process view of the contract
and enables us to determine what the status of the agreement
is (what obligations hold), given an event or a sequence of
events that concern the performance of actions by agents.
As the underlying model is so familiar in Artificial
Intelligence (for example situation calculus [7], or simplified
event calculus [6]), it would be feasible to build an
implementation.
In representations such as this, where events effect
transitions between states, the initiation or termination of
properties that hold in states (norms in this case) can be
expressed through the definition of appropriate relations
(such as initiates or terminates) between events and states.
Such relations essentially define the post-conditions of
events.  As mentioned previously, states in our state
diagram do not necessarily offer a complete view of the
contract.  We have only been showing activated
obligations in states that are arrived at through some
transition, and we have assumed that any obligations from
the previous state that are not explicitly stated are assumed
to be discharged.  In addition to establishing what norms
become activated or discharged, we are also interested in
what norms persist over transitions between states.  This is
one of the subjects of ongoing work in the area of
temporally qualified obligations (for example [2] and the
discussion in [10]) and has not been dealt with in this
work.  It is however relevant to possible future extensions
to our proposed representation of contracts as processes.
As was noted earlier we do not provide a formal account
for action negation (negated transition labels) and time
constraints here.  This is another possible avenue for future
work.
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